Rule Info
Name
RedSun - Conhost.exe Spawned by TieringEngineService.exe
Author
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), @unresolvedhost
Description
Detects two stages of the RedSun post-exploitation process chain that deliver a SYSTEM-level shell to the attacker's interactive session.
Observed process chain
services.exe
→ TieringEngineService.exe
→ conhost.exe (SYSTEM, CommandLine: bare path, no arguments)
→ cmd.exe / shell (SYSTEM, TerminalSessionId = attacker's session)
Stage 1 — TieringEngineService.exe spawns argument-less conhost.exe:
After winning the oplock + Cloud Files mount point race, the malicious TieringEngineService.exe (RedSun.exe copied to System32, started via CoCreateInstance
/ services.exe) detects it is NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM and calls LaunchConsoleInSessionId().
This opens \\.\pipe\REDSUN, reads the attacker's session ID, duplicates the SYSTEM token, re-stamps it with that session ID via SetTokenInformation(TokenSessionId), then
calls CreateProcessAsUser to spawn conhost.exe with no arguments.
Stage 2 — Shell spawned from rogue conhost.exe (EDR sources with GrandParentImage):
The rogue SYSTEM conhost.exe spawns a shell (cmd.exe, PowerShell, etc.) as SYSTEM in the attacker's interactive session.
On EDR sources that expose GrandParentImage, the full three-level chain (TieringEngineService.exe → conhost.exe → shell) can be matched directly.
The legitimate TieringEngineService.exe is a headless COM server that is unlikely to spawn conhost.exe under normal conditions.
Date
2026-04-17 00:00:00
Modified
None
Id
2ad78473-6978-40f5-b8f1-89c7e1c27a1a
Tags
attack.privilege-escalation attack.stealth attack.t1134.002 attack.t1036.005 detection.emerging-threats
Type
Community Rule
Link to Public Repo
